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ABSTRACT
Under what conditions are Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration (DDR) programs successfully implemented following
intrastate conﬂict? Previous research is dominated by under-
theorized case studies that lack the ability to detect the precise
factors and mechanisms that lead to successful DDR. In this
article, we draw on game theory and ask how the number of veto
players, their policy distance, and their internal cohesion impact
DDR implementation. Using empirical evidence from Nepal and
the Democratic Republic of Congo, we show that the number of
veto players, rather than their distance and cohesion, explains the
(lack of) implementation of DDR.
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Introduction
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs have become essential
components of post-conﬂict peacebuilding. By collecting and disposing of weapons and
ammunition from combatants, discharging ex-combatants from their respective armed
groups and reintegrating them into civilian communities, DDR programs are widely
regarded a core necessity to foster peace after war (Knight and Özerdem 2004; Muggah
and O’Donnell 2015).
Increasingly, scholarly research studies the causes and consequences of successful DDR
programs. Four recurring themes dominate the debate. First, studies spell out a number of
technical requirements for successful DDR, such as arms reduction (e.g. Colletta, Kostner,
and Wiederhofer 1996; Muggah 2005), sequencing, or creating economic opportunities for
ex-combatants through education projects or small business loans (Banholzer 2014;
Munive and Stepputat 2015). Second, studies discuss the vital role of international
actors for DDR success, such as of the United Nations (UN) or international development
and humanitarian organizations (Ball 1997). Third, studies examine the relationship
between successful DDR and Security Sector Reform or SSR (Ball 1997; Mobekk 2009),
noting that DDR is often an essential prior step to SSR that helps to increase trust
between warring parties and creates a culture in which the use of weapons becomes unli-
kely (Muggah 2005). Finally, studies increasingly focus on the role of gender identities
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(Colletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer 1996; Kaufman and Williams 2015), emphasizing that
DDR programs also fail as they ignore the special needs of female combatants (Jennings
2009).
But despite the increasing attention in the literature, what works in post-conﬂict DDR
and what doesn’t is often not very clear. This lack of systematic knowledge on what
factors determine the variation in DDR success is also due to the fact that past research
is dominated by under-theorized single case studies or policy-oriented best-practice
guidelines. While studies oﬀer ﬁne-grained insights into the dynamics of DDR in a few pro-
minent cases, they are little integrated into the wider theoretical literature on post-conﬂict
peacebuilding and lack the ability to detect the precise variables and causal mechanisms
aﬀecting the success of DDR (cf. Ansorg, Haass, and Strasheim 2013).
To tackle this shortcoming, we examine the utility of veto player theory in identifying
the conditions that increase the likelihood of successful DDR implementation. Veto
player theory is part of the wider ﬁeld on game theory. It rests on a number of assump-
tions, which include the following: veto players take rational decisions to increase their
beneﬁt; they are aware of the rules of the game and they have certain preferences over
outcomes; veto players adopt one or more strategies to tackle the problem; outcomes
are dependent on the preferences of actors and institutions of a political system (Tsebelis
2002, 17ﬀ.). Veto player theory can be adopted for a number of situations, including policy
decisions on DDR after large-scale conﬂict.
In this paper, we explore how (1) the number of veto players, (2) their distance, cap-
tured through the aspect of ethnic cleavages, and (3) their internal cohesion, captured
through the degree of fractionalization and leadership continuity, aﬀect DDR implemen-
tation. We thereby follow past research and consider such implementation to be success-
ful if most or all of the anticipated number of weapons and ammunitions held by
combatants are turned in and/or destroyed; most or all of the expected number of ex-com-
batants have participated in a demobilization program; and most or all of the expected
number of ex-combatants are reintegrated into society (cf. Joshi, Quinn, and Regan 2015).
We use the cases of DDR in Nepal and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to illus-
trate the mechanisms predicted by veto-player theory. Both cases oﬀer fruitful empirical
insights into key components of the veto player approach: Nepal saw a select number
of veto players with similar policy goals and a moderate degree of fractionalization;
while the DDR process in the DRC had to deal with a large number of distanced and frac-
tionalized players. As selecting cases from distinct world regions ‘still constitutes the
exception to the rule’ when analyzing policies in the Global South (Basedau and Köllner
2007, 112), we expect that our results do not reﬂect factors that are speciﬁc to only one
region, but represent a more generic explanation of success and failure of the implemen-
tation of DDR. Having said that, we explicitly stress that the diﬀerent context conditions in
the two cases do not allow us to employ an explicitly comparative methodological strat-
egy. These distinct context conditions include, but are not limited to, the regional
dynamics in the case of the DRC as opposed to the conﬂict in Nepal that was conﬁned
in its national borders; or the role natural resources played in the DRC without taking
on a similar signiﬁcance in Nepal. Instead of explicitly comparing the two cases, we
rather use them to illustrate and highlight theoretical mechanisms derived from the
veto player approach. The two cases provide a useful empirical background to test our
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theoretical assumptions and to reveal limitations of the theory, in particular in a highly
dynamic and volatile political environment.
For the case study on Nepal’s DDR program, our analysis chieﬂy rests on new infor-
mation gathered through semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions. In
total, 57 interviews and three focus group discussions were conducted during two
rounds of ﬁeld work in the fall of 2015 and spring of 2017. Interviewees included
current and previous members of government; high-ranking oﬃcers in the Nepal Army
(NA); former child soldiers, (female) combatants, and commanders of the Communist
Party of Nepal (Maoist) or CPN (M) rebels; as well as members of civil society and the inter-
national community. Focus groups were held with former combatants integrated into the
NA as well as ‘regular’ NA soldiers. Most individuals spoke under the condition of anon-
ymity, and about half of the discussions took place with the help of a translator. The
case study additionally draws on existing research, policy reports, and news articles.
For the case study on the DRC, we had to rely on primary and secondary sources, as ﬁeld
work originally planned for March 2017 was too dangerous to conduct, due to ongoing
tensions following the refusal of President Kabila to step down after his constitutionally
mandated two-term limit expired in December 2016. We thus rely on programme
reports and evaluations by the World Bank and other actors, independent assessments
by third actors, as well as single case studies and policy reports. We are aware that the
information gathered through these sources is limited in comparison to ﬁeldwork-gener-
ated data. However, as the Congolese DDR process is well assessed by donors and actors,
we believe that this provides us with the necessary information to conduct our analysis.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In section two, we elaborate on the
theoretical assumptions of veto player theory in DDR programs. In section three, we brieﬂy
introduce the background to each case and DDR program, before providing empirical evi-
dence on the causal mechanisms linking our independent and dependent variables. In
sum, our ﬁndings suggest that while the number of veto players is a sound explanation
for the (lack of) implementation of DDR in both cases, our results are more ambiguous
when it comes to the policy distance and cohesion of players. Section four concludes
by outlining avenues for future research.
Veto players and the implementation of DDR programs
What explains the successful implementation of DDR? Tsebelis (e.g. 1995, 2002) oﬀers a
useful framework to study this puzzle by analyzing how diﬀerent conﬁgurations of veto
players aﬀect the possibility of policy change. He deﬁnes veto players as ‘individual or col-
lective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo’ (Tsebelis 2002,
19), and argues that every political system has a certain conﬁguration of players that
makes the departure from the status quo (‘policy change’) more or less likely. Here, we
deﬁne the successful implementation of DDR as such policy change or as movement
away from the status quo that is the presence of fully armed and mobilized warring
parties. Veto players are thus those actors who have the skills and ability to successfully
veto the implementation of DDR. Following Tsebelis, we can formulate three hypotheses
about what conﬁgurations of players should aﬀect the successful implementation of DDR.
First, we expect a higher number of veto players to decrease the possibility of policy
change: If decision-making over policy change is delegated to one player, the status
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quo follows her policy positions, but as the number of players required to agree to a move-
ment away from the status quo increases, the ability for policy change decreases. Many
actors can be veto players in conﬂict-aﬀected societies, and Cunningham (2013, 38)
deﬁnes veto players in such contexts as groups ‘that have the ability to block an end to
war’ even if other actors agree to implementing a peace deal. Such players include gov-
ernments and rebel groups, as well as external states supporting these parties. Cunning-
ham (2013, 41) notes that not all rebel groups are automatically veto players, and that
those that have more troops or better military equipment and training are more likely
to be veto players.
H1: The likelihood of successfully implementing post-conﬂict DDR programs decreases as the
number of veto players increases.
Second, following the veto player approach we expect that an increase of the policy
distance of players required to change the status quo reduces the likelihood of policy
change (Tsebelis 1995, 298): More diverse preferences of players shrink the size of
the bargaining range and the chance of coming to terms on a deal all players ﬁnd accep-
table (Cunningham 2006, 881). While veto player approaches in the political science
literature often use ideological preferences of players on a left-right continuum to con-
ceptualize the polarization of players, Cunningham (2006, 2013) suggests to use a
diﬀerent measurement to capture polarization in conﬂict-aﬀected societies. He argues
that splinter rebel groups are unlikely to bring a diverse set of policy preferences to
the table, meaning their position should be more congruent with other players in the
game. Further ways of conceptualizing polarization suggested in the peace and
conﬂict literature are ethnic cleavages (Svensson 2009) and indivisible stakes in war
(Cunningham 2011, 90).
H2: The likelihood of successfully implementing post-conﬂict DDR programs decreases as the
policy distance between veto players increases.
Third, following veto player theory we expect that the internal cohesion of collective
veto players, deﬁned as the ‘similarity of policy position’ of the constituent units of
players (Tsebelis 1995, 301), aﬀects policy change. According to Tsebelis, less cohesive
players increase the possibility for incremental change as small deviations from the
status quo may be approved by the majority. We expect that this assumption does
not translate to highly volatile post-conﬂict situations. In fact, Cunningham (2006) pro-
poses capturing player cohesiveness in such contexts by studying whether or not a
party avoided fractionalization and leadership change during war. Following this strat-
egy, we expect that if the claims of a cohesive party are met in peace negotiations, it
will likely stop ﬁghting and adhere to the terms of DDR negotiated in a peace deal. A
centralized authority and lack of fractionalization can encourage a better implemen-
tation as parties execute orders along the lines of authority. Fractionalized parties
might, however, continue ﬁghting if one fraction feels under-represented or thinks it
can get a better deal in future. Fractionalized parties may thus be less likely to
implement change.
H3: The likelihood of successfully implementing post-conﬂict DDR programs decreases as the
cohesion within collective veto players decreases.
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Empirical evidence from Nepal and the DRC
Veto players and post-DDR in Nepal
Nepal’s ‘People’s War’ broke out in February 1996, when Maoist insurgents began attack-
ing police stations and government oﬃces particularly in the Rolpa and Rukum districts in
Western Nepal. Promising to ﬁght against widespread poverty and the discrimination of
minorities as well as to fundamentally transform the government system of the country,
the Maoists particularly mobilized members of Nepal’s marginalized communities into
their ranks. Among them were women, members of the lower Hindu castes, and min-
orities, such as Madhesis from the southern Terai plains (Pettigrew and Shneiderman
2004; Kantha 2011). What began as a low intensity conﬂict as the Maoists were initially
only ﬁghting the Nepal Police (NP), escalated into a conﬂict with a much higher
number in annual battle-related deaths from 2001 onwards. In response to attacks on
the RNA by the Maoists’ armed wing, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the king mobi-
lized the army in 2001, and the government additionally created the paramilitary Armed
Police Force (APF) to defeat the insurgency. In November 2006, the Maoists and a coalition
of seven political parties – but not the royal palace – signed a peace agreement and
agreed on several political and military reforms, including to disarm, demobilize, and
reintegrate the combatants of the PLA.
DDR thus represented a key component of Nepal’s peace process. Within weeks follow-
ing the signing of the accord, Maoist combatants moved into seven cantonment sites and
21 smaller satellite camps that were set up throughout the country. The camps were estab-
lished with the help of the small monitoring UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN). In April 2007,
UNMIN reported that all weapons were registered and stored in sealed containers moni-
tored by its personnel, although by the terms of the peace accord the keys to these con-
tainers stayed with the on-site PLA commanders and were not completely detached from
the combatants (United Nations 2007). Only in 2012, the Maoists allowed the NA to take
over the control of its weapons, thereby completing the disarmament process in a more
narrow understanding of the concept (Dahal 2012). Demobilization and reintegration were
equally protracted until 2012–2013. Among the issues that prolonged these phases were
political disagreements between the Maoist leadership, the leaders of the political parties
and the NA on mechanisms regarding the reintegration of child soldiers, the number of
veriﬁed combatants, monetary compensation for ex-combatants, and on the mode of inte-
grating Maoist ex-combatants into the NA (INT-02, 24.04.2017). In the end, more than
15,000 ex-combatants chose the ‘retirement package’ which entailed cash payments
(Bogati 2015), while 1400 ex-combatants joined the ranks of the NA (Martin Chautari
2013; Subedi 2015). The cantonments closed in 2013.
Today, most observers regard Nepal’s DDR process as one of the key accomplishments
of the peace process and stress that the Maoists have successfully transformed from an
armed group into a political party that has won – and lost – elections in the post-
conﬂict period (Ishiyama and Batta 2011).1 Can this be explained by the conﬁguration
of veto players? We deﬁned veto players above as those actors that possess the skills
and ability to veto the implementation of a DDR program. Between 2007 and 2013, the
period of implementing DDR in Nepal, the number of veto players was select. Because
the royal palace dramatically lost its inﬂuence in the initial days of the transition in
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2006–07, the number of veto players is eﬀectively limited to (1) the Maoist rebels that later
(and after the end of the DDR program) split into several factions (cf. below), (2) the gov-
ernment side to the conﬂict that itself consists of several political parties and coalitions, as
well as (3) the NA.
The number of veto players
This select number of veto players helped the successful implementation of the DDR
process in Nepal. The only rebel group that was to be subjected to DDR was the CPN
(M). At the time of signing the CPA, this Maoist rebellion was approximately 30,000
ﬁghters strong, although this number included about 3000 child soldiers and 1000 com-
batants that had been recruited after the signing of a ceaseﬁre accord in mid-2006 (United
Nations 2007). While the PLA chieﬂy fought with small arms, it had demonstrated that it
could eﬀectively control the countryside and bring signiﬁcant parts of territory under its
control (International Crisis Group 2005).
The government, particularly the Nepali Congress (NC) party and (to a lesser extent) the
United Marxist-Leninist (UML), controlled the NP and APF security agencies during the war
and thus in total approximately 100,000 oﬃcers. The NA – that had increased from 46,000
to 96,000 soldiers by the end of the war – had traditionally been under de facto control of
the royal palace (Adhikari 2015). But even though it was brought under parliamentary
control in 2006 and is an institution that abides by the decisions of the civilian leadership,
it is regarded as a major player in the post-conﬂict period with signiﬁcant power to disrupt
the peace process (Sotomayor 2014).2
The palace itself, however, was sidelined in the early days of the peace process and
could no longer represent a major threat to peace or the DDR process, hence losing its
position of a veto player. On the one hand, this loss of power for the palace eased
cooperation between other players (INT-17, 30.09.2015, INT-18, 06.10.2015). This is also
highlighted by an ex-deputy commander of the PLA, who points out that all parties
‘were in a common agreement and […] on the people’s side, [while…] the monarchy
[…was] the representative of some minor […] feudal class. So if there had been a […]
coup, it wouldn’t have been successful’ (INT-01, 26.09.2015). One the other hand, the side-
lining of the palace and its inability to take on the role of a veto player was also the result of
cooperation between the Maoists and the political parties. The former knew that they
could not capture the state on their own, for instance as the political parties had signiﬁcant
support in the cities (Gobyn 2009). And the political parties – ﬁghting the increasingly
authoritarian tendencies of the King – realized the beneﬁts of bringing the Maoists into
their collective protests against the royal palace (Subedi and Bhattarai 2017). In sum,
the small number of veto players in Nepal thus provides evidence for our ﬁrst hypothesis,
as it aided the cooperation between parties and the successful implementation of the DDR
process.
The distance between veto players
Another important factor in the successful implementation of Nepal’s DDR process was
the small distance between players. This becomes evident by two means. First, even
though there existed an ethnic component to Nepal’s war – as the Maoists chieﬂy mobi-
lized members of marginalized ethnic and social groups into their ranks (Gellner 2007) –
parties did not split along ethnic lines. Instead, all leaders of the Maoists, government
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parties, and security agencies belonged to the identity group that has always dominated
the political system (von Einsiedel, Malone, and Pradhan 2012). All were male, Nepali-
speaking, high-caste Hindus from Nepal’s central hill region. Ethnic or religious minorities,
lower castes, women, or individuals from the northern Himalayas or the southern Terai
region of Nepal were only represented in lower ranks of the parties or security agencies
(Adhikari 2015). Many leaders of the diﬀerent warring parties had therefore established
close relationships before the war, also while studying at universities in India (Jha 2014).
In interviews, a former government minister and NC member thus pointed out that
lines of communication always remained open (INT-06, 19.10.2015).
While this dominance of one identity group has contributed to a resurgence in minority
politics and protests in recent years (Sijapati 2013), it aided the implementation of DDR
because it translated into a small distance between veto players. This is because the
belonging to similar identity groups eased communication, rebuilding of trust, and
cooperation on an elite level, and especially between PLA commanders and NA generals
in the Special Committee for the Integration and Rehabilitation of Maoist Combatants, one of
the main bodies entrusted with the DDR process. Mediators involved in the formal and
informal negotiations regarding the DDR process and the Special Committee remembered
that after initial hesitations, the warring party representatives started to trust each other
more and more (INT-14, 03.05.2017). And former NA generals tended to point out they
felt ‘more similar than diﬀerent’ to their Maoist counterparts; and that by working
together in the Special Committee they became ‘brothers’ (INT-07, 27.09.2015, INT-08,
25.04.2017).
Second, what also helped the successful implementation of DDR was that the parties’
policy agendas with regard to the reintegration of ex-combatants were not opposed,
again showing the small distance between players. At the leadership level, and due to
the high degree of local ownership in the peace process, the parties could not point to
the international community for any delays in implementing the DDR process. Instead,
they were fully aware that voters would blame any failures in implementation on the
parties themselves (Suhrke 2011). A civil society expert also noted that Maoist leaders
also wanted to ensure their control over state institutions not only through the electoral
process, but also by integrating as many of combatants as possible into the NA (INT-02,
24.04.2017). Despite initial resistance – arguing that the inclusion of politically indoctri-
nated combatants into the NA would pose a risk to the army’s professionalism – this
goal was supported by NA leaders (INT-08, 25.04.2017). In interviews, an academic and
a security expert reasoned that the NA wanted to demonstrate its commitment to
peace to the UN, for which it traditionally serves as one of the largest troop contributors
(INT-05, 02.05.2017, INT-14, 03.05.2017). Prestige and reputation are further reasons cited
by NA generals, who argue that as members of UN peacekeeping forces they had them-
selves overseen DDR programs abroad and had felt ‘humiliated’ if they could not have
completed this process at home (INT-07, 27.09.2015).
At the rank-and-ﬁle level, also Maoist combatants and NA soldiers were keen in bring-
ing the DDR process to an end. Having spent their youth in war, ex-combatants hoped for
a speedy realization of the DDR process as many of them wanted to get married and start
families (INT-09, 10.10.2015, Martin Chautari 2013). Many ex-combatants also settled in
urban areas as opposed to their often rural places of origin, as urban areas (and especially
Kathmandu) oﬀered improved access to jobs, education, and infrastructure (Bogati 2015).
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NA soldiers perceived that only a successful DDR process meant they could return to visit
their families in villages that had been controlled by the PLA in war (FG-01, 28.04.2017).
Evidence from Nepal’s DDR process thus provides support for our second hypothesis:
the small distance between players due to (1) a lack of ethnicized relationships and (2)
a presence of similar policy interests contributed to the successful implementation of
the DDR process.
The fractionalization of veto players
While the Maoist movement can be characterized as coherent and with a strong leader-
ship under Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) and Baburam Bhattarai at the start of the
DDR process, it became increasingly horizontally and vertically fractionalized over time.
On the one hand, there is evidence that this increasing fractionalization even positively
impacted DDR implementation, contrary to our theoretical expectations. Horizontally,
the uniﬁed Maoist movement led by war-time leader Prachanda experienced several
splits in the aftermath of the war. A ﬁrst splinter group was formed towards the end of
the DDR process in 2012 by Mohan Baidya (Kiran) and Ram Bahadur Thapa (Badal);
other factions led by Netra Bikram Chand (Biplav) and Baburam Bhattarai broke away in
2014 and 2015 respectively. Vertically, the Maoist movement became also less cohesive
in the post-conﬂict period, as the gap between leadership and combatants widened.
Several observers account this disintegration to the level of corruption among elites.
They remark that as soon as leaders joined the transitional government, they underwent
a ‘remarkable change in… lifestyle’ (Dahal 2008, 28) by using their new role in state insti-
tutions to prioritize their individual economic beneﬁts over the needs of combatants
(Adhikari and Gautam 2014). One political opponent and member of the NC noted that
Maoist elites became ‘the richest people’ of ‘the richest party within one year’ (INT-10,
12.10.2015). This alienated elites and combatants, as the latter felt betrayed by the leader-
ship (INT-11, 22.09.2015, INT-12, 05.10.2015). In a widely circulated interview, Prachanda’s
ex-driver was quoted: ‘The ideals that we have fought for have all been wasted… This is
not the communist spirit. This is why I decided to disassociate from Prachanda’ (Nepali
Times 2012).
There is some evidence that this disintegration aided the implementation of the DDR
process, and a former child soldier noted that the ex-combatant’s disillusionment with
the leadership prevented any hypothetical return to arms (INT-03, 02.05.2017). One
former NA general held:
Many people ask me if [ex-combatants] will take up their weapons again. My answer is [they]
will not… because they were so badly used by their political leaders. They gave their lives, but
they got nothing in return. Will they again go to war to make somebody rich, make somebody
Prime Minister? No. (INT-13, 29.09.2015)
On the other hand, it is diﬃcult to establish a causal link, as the dynamics of the DDR
process may have caused this increasing fractionalization in the ﬁrst place. This
becomes evident by looking at concrete measures taking place in the demobilization
camps. For instance, an aid worker remembered setting up radios in the camps to
provide combatants waiting for their demobilization with leisure activities (INT-15,
12.11.2015). But, as a civil society leader pointed out, only after these radios were per-
mitted, combatants became exposed to other political opinions than those of their own
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leaders, began to follow the political negotiations in Kathmandu, and started to become
frustrated by the leadership’s behaviour (INT-16, 19.10.2015). Evidence from Nepal thus
does not provide support for our third hypothesis: a decreasing cohesion of veto
players did not aﬀect the successful implementation of DDR.
Veto players and post-conﬂict DDR in the DRC
The DRC (former Zaire) suﬀered from extensive exploitation and destruction during colo-
nial times, and in 1965 almost seamlessly transitioned into the authoritarian regime of one
of the most corrupt dictators on the African continent, Mobutu Sese Seko. Mobutu’s Zaire
was a safe haven for many rebel groups, such as the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). Due to this undisturbed activity of countless
rebel groups, insecurity grew in the whole Great Lakes region (cf. Prunier 2009). In 1994,
the genocide in Rwanda heralded the fall of Mobutu. The inﬂux of hundreds of thousands
of refugees from Rwanda and growing insecurity led to the development and intervention
of the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire (AFDL), sup-
ported by Rwandan, Ugandan, and Angolan troops who aimed to terminate the insecurity
originating from Zaire. After a seven-month long war, the alliance overthrew Mobutu in
May 1997 and Laurent-Desiré Kabila took power in his place. Kabila soon fell out with
his former allies from Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, and they supported rebel groups
that fought against the new government, such as the RCD and MLC (cf. below). On
Kabila’s side, his allies from SADC, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, intervened in the
violent conﬂict. Sudan and Chad also intervened brieﬂy on the side of Kabila, but they
withdrew in 1999. Because of the involvement of nine diﬀerent countries and countless
rebel groups the war between 1998 and 2002 is also known as ‘Africa’s World War’
(Prunier 2009).
A withdrawal of foreign troops was agreed upon in the Lusaka agreement of 1999, yet it
was not until 2002 that all foreign regular forces left the country. At the same time, many
rebel groups from Uganda, Burundi, or Rwanda were (and partly are) still active in the DRC,
competing against the countless Congolese rebel groups that were the source of insecur-
ity particularly in the east of the country. The main aim of the DDR program was thus to
reduce the number of armed groups in the country and to end the violence.
Shortly after the Lusaka peace agreement in 1999, the United Nations Organization
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC, renamed
MONUSCO in 2010) was established with the aim to support peace-building measures
in the country. At the oﬃcial end of Congo’s Second war in 2002, after foreign troops
had oﬃcially left the country, the World Bank started the biggest and most comprehensive
DDR program in its history, the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program
(MDRP) (cf. World Bank 2010). It ran from 2002 to 2009 and included ﬁve national pro-
grams and ten special projects. In the DRC, the lead program was the Programme National
de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion, PNDDR. At that time, the DRC had virtually
no capacity in place for handling the programme, and so the Commission Nationale de la
Démobilisation et Réinsertion (CONADER) was formed as a body to manage the DDR
program (Scanteam 2010, 75f.). By the end of 2008, a total of 102,014 of the Congolese
ex-combatants were oﬃcially demobilized (against a target of 150,000) (World Bank 2010,
28f.), and demobilization continued throughout 2009. All of the 102,014 ex-combatants
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received reinsertion payments, and cell phone payments were used to compensate for
the lack of a functioning banking system. Actual assistance for reintegration was
provided to 54% of the demobilized combatants (ibid.). Those ﬁghters who have not
been demobilized continue to be active in the DRC, for example in the countless
Mai-Mai factions across the country.
In general, since 2002 peace and stability have slightly improved in the DRC. However, it
is doubtful that this can be attributed to the PNDDR, but rather to a change in power
dynamics in the country. The demobilization of the over 100,000 ex-combatants can be
attributed to a successful political processes that led to the signing and subsequent
implementation of peace agreements (Scanteam 2010, 119). However, after the end of
the DDR program, violence was still ongoing particularly in the eastern parts of the
DRC, and countless armed groups as well as Congolese regular forces are still responsible
for insecurity and instability in the country.
During the DDR process, the DRC faced a high number of veto players from inside and
outside the country. The main actor in the process was the Congolese government. After
the killing of his father Laurent-Desiré Kabila in 2001, Joseph Kabila took over as president.
During the peace process, he tried to co-opt some of the veto players into the government
by giving them important positions and control over ministries. Particularly the Rassemble-
ment Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) and the Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo
(MLC), the two major rebel groups ﬁghting against the government between 1998 and
2003, were co-opted into Kabila’s government. The diﬀerent fractions of RCD summed
up to about 70,000 ﬁghters, whereas the MLC counted about 30,000 ﬁghters (Allen
2011, 48). The armed elements of RCD and MLC were incorporated into the Congolese
regular armed forces, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
(FARDC), and the elites received inﬂuential posts in the government.
Another major veto player are the Congolese regular armed forces, or FARDC, summing
up about 100,000–200,000 soldiers by the oﬃcial end of the war (Allen 2011, 48). While
they were in theory controlled by the Congolese government, they became in fact
more and more heterogonous during the peace process due to several waves of inte-
gration of diﬀerent rebel groups. Particularly in the periphery of the country, they tend
to have a life of their own, and are responsible for serious human rights violations (cf.
HRW 2010).
The Front des Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes (FNI) was a rebel group that was mainly
active in Ituri and was dominated by ethnic Lendus. There are no ﬁgures about the number
of ﬁghters of the FNI. It is said that they were supported by Rwanda and had close ties to
AngloGold Ashanti, a corporate mining company that cooperated with the FNI on gold
extraction (Allen 2011, 41). The FNI participated in several rounds of DDR, and the arrest
of FNI leadership in February of 2008 lead to a dissolution of the movement. Another
Ituri-based rebel group and opponent of FNI was the Union des Patriotes Congolais
(UPC). The UPC drew its ﬁghters from the ethnic Hemas and it is said that the UPC was
supported by Rwanda (Allen 2011, 42). The majority of its roughly 15,000 ﬁghters has
been processed through the DDR program.
The Mai-Mai militias continue to be a major veto player across the DRC until today. A
lose network of combatants ﬁghting against the inﬁltration of Congo by ‘foreign
forces’, they underwent signiﬁcant DDR measures. However, because they are so
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widespread and splintered, the militias continue to be active as of today. In 2004, the Mai-
Mai militias were estimated at 30,000–50,000 ﬁghters (World Bank 2009, 2).
Besides the more genuine Congolese armed groups there were also countless foreign
groups active on Congo’s territory. One of the main veto players in the East of the DRC
during the 2000s were the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) with an
estimated strength of 6000–8000 ﬁghters (Allen 2011, 43). They are the remnants of the
Hutu militias that were responsible for the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and that had
ﬂed the country after the Rwandan Patriotic Front intervened to protect the Tutsis. As
they are not seen as Congolese armed group, they are not integrated into the national
DDR program. As a result of the ongoing violence against Tutsis and Rwanda by the
FDLR, Laurent Nkunda, a former FARDC commander, established the Tutsi-led Congrès
national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP). According to estimates by Congolese military
authorities in Goma, the CNDP consisted of about 8000–8500 ﬁghters in 2007, although
these estimates are disputed (HRW 2007, 21). It is said that the CNDP was largely
backed by the Rwandan government (HRW 2007, 4), but was active mostly in the East
of the Congo. The activities of CNDP were brought to an end with the arrest of Laurent
Nkunda by Rwandan forces in January of 2009. CNDP forces were reincorporated into
the FARDC.
During the 2000s, two Ugandan rebel groups were active in the Northeast of Congo: the
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). There is no reliable
information on the number of ﬁghters for both groups (cf. Allen 2011, 51; Pehle and
Speyer 2015). Both groups continue to be a source of insecurity and violence. The Burun-
dian Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie–Forces pour la Défense de la Démo-
cratie (CNDD–FDD) used to be active in the war from 1998–2003. With the signing of the
peace agreement in Burundi in 2005 it became a major political party and retreated from
Congo. Another Burundi rebel group ﬁghting alongside the Congolese military against the
Burundi army was the Forces nationales de libération (FNL). During the peace process in
Burundi, they also laid down their arms and demobilized in Burundi.
Besides these ‘obvious’ veto players there are other actors who were indirectly linked
to the actors in Congo. For instance, even after they withdraw from the DRC, Uganda and
Rwanda continued to support anti-Kabila rebel groups with weapons and funding.
The number of veto players
As becomes evident from the description in the previous section, the sheer number of
veto players already posed a challenge to the successful implementation of the DDR
program. While some of the Congolese armed groups such as RDC and MLC could be
co-opted into the government or were in such a weak position to participate voluntarily
in the DDR program, it was particularly those groups that had a regional link that pre-
vented a successful implementation of the programme. For instance, the FDLR was not
integrated into any of the ﬁve national programs of the MDRP: the conﬂict with the gov-
ernment of Rwanda was ongoing throughout the 2000s. The Rwandan government
refused to negotiate with those who committed the genocide in 1994 (Des Forges
1999). And from Congolese side they were seen as Rwandan rebels that should not
undergo a Congolese DDR program (Autesserre 2010).
Another important veto player particularly after 2006 was the CNDP. Even though most
of the ﬁghters originated from Congo, they refused to demobilize. The CNDP saw their aim
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in ﬁghting against the Rwandan rebels from the FDLR, and they continued to receive mili-
tary support from the Rwandan government, which made them more likely to be veto
players, according to veto player theory (Cunningham 2013, 38). Other foreign rebel
groups were only slowly demobilized (such as the Burundian CNDD-FDD and FNL). The
Ugandan LRA and ADF continue to be active in Northern Congo and the Central African
Republic as of 2017 (Uppsala Conﬂict Data Program 2017).
The number of veto players from within and outside of Congo provides empirical
evidence for our ﬁrst hypothesis: the high number of rebel groups who did not partici-
pate in the DDR program decreased the likelihood of successfully implementing the
programme.
The distance between veto players
Another factor that might have inﬂuenced the implementation of the DDR process in
Congo was the distance between the diﬀerent veto players. While the diﬀerent splinter
groups, for instance of RDC and MLC, did not have very diverse policy preferences, it
was particularly ethnic conﬂicts that lied at the heart of the polarization between the Con-
golese warring parties.
This becomes evident particularly in the Tutsi-Hutu divide that has a destabilizing
impact on the whole region until today. Again, the Hutu militias of the FDLR were not
seen as genuine Congolese, and thus they did not participate in the Congolese DDR
program. However, they continued to be a source of insecurity not only for Rwanda,
but for Eastern Congo as well. As a result, the largely Tutsi-led CNDP was founded and
fought against the FDLR in the East of the Congo. Rwanda continued to support the
CNDP, as they saw the FDLR as major threat to their own security, but also to members
of the Rwandophone community in Congo (Autesserre 2006, 7). However, for Rwanda
the continued activities of the FDLR were not the only reason to support anti-FDLR
forces, but also a good excuse to engage in economic activities in the resource-rich East
of Congo and the exploitation of valuable resources as well (Global Witness 2005; Autes-
serre 2006, 8). Autesserre argues that ‘the combination of these security, political, and
economic interests led Rwanda to actively support several armed groups responsible
for local violence in the eastern Congo’ (Autesserre 2006, 8). And also national actors
such as the RCD or Mai-Mai took ethnic tensions as an excuse for continued warfare
(Autesserre 2006, 11).
Hence, particularly in the Congolese setting the continued violence cannot be alone
reduced to ethnic rivalries and the (ethnic) distance between veto players. While rebel
groups usually recruit their combatants from speciﬁc ethnic background, the conﬂicts
are often caused by competition over land and resources. As Autesserre states, ‘local
antagonisms over land and traditional power led to violence’ particularly in the east of
the country (Autesserre 2006, 3). This includes competition over land and resources,
poverty, and a lack of a governing or controlling authority (Autesserre 2006, 13ﬀ.;
Stearns, Verweijen, and Baaz 2013, 30). Militia networks drove and were driven by the
development of a war economy, which thrived on illegal taxation, smuggling, and racke-
teering (Stearns, Verweijen, and Baaz 2013, 21). While this economy allowed for the quick
enrichment of some, millions of civilians depended on it for survival, leaving them little
choice but to collaborate with armed groups. Further, over the course of the peace
process, the increasing availability of many ex-combatants did exacerbate this situation:
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they were often not re-integrated into their communities or did not have any alternative
means of gaining a livelihood (Stearns, Verweijen, and Baaz 2013, 77). A re-mobilization
was hence easier or the only feasible option for the former ﬁghters to survive.
Evidence from the Congolese DDR process does not fully support our second hypoth-
eses that the likelihood of successfully implementing post-conﬂict DDR programs
decreases as the policy distance between veto players increases.
The fractionalization of veto players
The last factor that played a decisive role in the implementation of the DDR program in
Congo was the fractionalization of the Congolese veto players. The government, for
instance, was due to the integration of diﬀerent conﬂict parties highly fractionalized.
Several actors in the government such as RCD and MLC opposed DDR of their military
wings particularly in the ﬁrst years until the election. The diﬀerent parties wanted to
keep their command and control structure until elections had been held (Scanteam
2010, 66f.). However, even after the elections and once the government was in place,
the motivation towards DDR continued to be reluctant. As mentioned before, control
over land and resources particularly in the periphery of the country was too lucrative
for some armed groups to give up arms and participate in the DDR process. Further, as
Stearns, Verweijen, and Baaz (2013, 8) argue, ‘the implied logic of this process—granting
insurgents political power in order to quell their insurgencies—persists until today, creat-
ing incentives for elites to mobilize armed groups’. Thus, the co-optation of former warring
parties into the government or military provided further incentives for mobilization
instead of ending the violence.
Further, the FARDC, Congolese regular armed forces, were also highly fractionalized,
which impeded the peace process and lead to a renewed outbreak of violence. By repeat-
edly integrating armed groups into the FARDC, the government has not only provided
incentives for further insurrection, it has eﬀectively sanctioned impunity (Stearns, Verwei-
jen, and Baaz 2013, 9). As stated before, some of the brigades led a life of their own without
clear command from Kinshasa, and committed serious human rights violations particularly
in the east of the country (cf. HRW 2010). After the elections in 2006 the brigades of
Laurent Nkunda broke away from the Congolese forces with the aim to protect the Con-
golese Tutsis from the violence of FDLR. The newly built CNDP did not only ﬁght against
the FDLR, but also against other forces of FARDC, and committed serious crimes against
non-Tutsi civilians (HRW 2007).
Non-state armed actors were also highly fractionalized, which contributed to a failure of
the DDR program. One example are the Mai-Mai militias, which are a lose and non-cohe-
sive network of armed groups ﬁghting against foreign groups in Congo (HIIK 2017, 70f.).
They are spread across diﬀerent regions of the Congo. The fractionalization of the Mai-
Mai militias exacerbates their demobilization; due to their widespread nature, more loca-
lized demobilization and reintegration programmes would be necessary to address the
diﬀerent claims by diﬀerent factions.
Evidence from the Congolese DDR process thus supports our third hypotheses that the
likelihood of successfully implementing post-conﬂict DDR programs decreases as the
cohesion within collective veto players decreases.
In Table 1, we give an overview of the ﬁndings from both case studies.
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Conclusion
Under what conditions are DDR programs successfully implemented after intrastate
conﬂict? Evidence from Nepal and the DRC shows that veto players can play a major
role in fostering or preventing a successful implementation of DDR. However, results are
ambiguous concerning diﬀerent aspects of the veto player theory.
First, our ﬁndings show that the number of veto players is a sound explanation for the
(lack of) implementation of DDR in both cases. In Nepal, the small number of veto players
helped the successful implementation of DDR, as it was beneﬁcial to the Maoist rebels’
integration into the post-conﬂict political system and favored cooperation between
players in the DDR program. On the contrary, the high number of veto players from
within and outside the country in Congo posed a particular challenge to the implemen-
tation of the DDR program. While donors tried to tackle the regional dimension of the
conﬂict with a Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, it was impossible
to integrate all players and demobilize the high number of diverse groups. Thus, our ﬁrst
hypothesis can be conﬁrmed: The likelihood of successfully implementing post-conﬂict
DDR programs decreases as the number of veto players increases.
The ﬁndings in regard to our second hypothesis on the distance between veto players
are not that straightforward. In Nepal, similar policy goals and a lack of ethnic adversary
were key to the successful implementation of the DDR program, as it beneﬁted
cooperation and trust-building. In Congo, the Tutsi-Hutu divide might be seen as the
heart of the ongoing violence in the country. However, this is only part of the story: the
root causes of conﬂict in Congo lie in the competition over land and resources, and are
exacerbated by poverty and the lack of a governing authority. Hence, the ethnic com-
ponent of the conﬂict is not suﬃcient to explain the failure of DDR, and we do not ﬁnd
suﬃcient evidence for our second hypothesis that the likelihood of successfully imple-
menting DDR decreases as the policy distance between players increases.
Third, evidence from Nepal indicates that a growing fractionalization of the rebel group
towards the end of the DDR program even aided its successful implementation, as the
alienation of rank-and-ﬁle combatants and rebel leaders prevented a remobilization for
violence. In Congo, on the other contrary, the strong fractionalization of all important
players – the government, the military, and the rebel groups – impeded a successful
implementation of the DDR process.
Table 1. Overview of veto players and DDR programs in Nepal and the DRC.
DDR in Nepal DDR in the DR Congo
Number of
veto players
Low: civilian government, army, CPN (M) rebel
group
High: Civilian government, army, several rebel
groups (RDC, MLC, FNI, FDLR, CNDP, Mai-Mai, etc.)
Distance Low: The parties did not split along ethnic lines and
had similar policy interests (e.g. on army
integration).
High: The Hutu-Tutsi divide has a destabilizing
impact; however, continued violence is also
caused by competition over land and resources.
Cohesion High (at ﬁrst): The CPN (M) was a uniﬁed rebel
group in 2007, but its fractionalization increased
during (and due to) the DDR process.
Low: All main actors (government, military, and
rebel groups) were highly fractionalized.
DDR program Successfully completed 2007-2013: The CPN (M) has
not rearmed and remobilized but has transformed
into a political party that has won and lost
elections.
Ongoing violence: Between 2002 and 2009, the
MDRP demobilized over 100,000 combatants,
but the root causes of conﬂict were not
addressed.
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These ﬁndings are highly relevant as they link scholarship on post-conﬂict DDR and
peacebuilding with the theoretical assumptions of the veto player theory. We adapted
the veto player approach to explore and reveal mechanisms and aspects that aﬀect the
implementation of DDR programs. The two case studies oﬀer rich empirical insights into
key components of the theoretical approach, including the number of veto players,
their distance, as well as their internal cohesion. The case studies provided a hard test
for the main assumptions of the theoretical approach by applying it to a challenging
environment of a highly dynamic and volatile post-conﬂict countries (George and
Bennett 2005, 23f.), and clariﬁed some of the main mechanisms that are speciﬁc to the
study of implementation of DDR programs in two post-conﬂict countries. We are thus
able to gain novel and detailed insights on determinants of eﬀective DDR programs
and post-conﬂict peacebuilding.
We also revealed two limitations of the veto player approach. First, Tsebelis developed
the theory to analyze political behaviour in stable political systems, but particularly the
DRC shows that conditions are diﬀerent in highly volatile post-conﬂict environments.
Even as players agreed to participate in DDR, the success of implementation was not
always given. Due to the political and socioeconomic context, former combatants were
often unable or unwilling to stick to peace, and took up arms again. This shows that a
deal to disarm and demobilize is not suﬃcient if other political or socioeconomic chal-
lenges are not tackled simultaneously. Second, veto player theory also shows weaknesses
when it comes to dynamic post-conﬂict environments and a change in the constitution of
veto players. It may be assumed that in Nepal, a high fractionalization at the start of the
peace processes would indeed have prevented a successful implementation of DDR, as
too many fractions would perhaps have prevented a joint agreement. However, as we
demonstrated above, the growing fractionalization of the rebel group towards the end
of the DDR program in fact aided the implementation. Such diverging eﬀects of the inde-
pendent variable throughout time are hard to model and cannot be assessed as straight-
forward as assumed by the theory.
These ﬁndings leave room for future research, for example on the impact and embedd-
edness of veto players in a particular political or socioeconomic that aﬀect preferences of
players and policy outcomes alike. In addition, future models can improve the theoretical
conceptualization of behaviour and preferences of veto players in highly dynamic and
volatile political situations that are so often found in conﬂict and post-conﬂict
environments.
List of interviews and focus group discussions
Interview INT-01, 26.09.2015, former deputy commander of the PLA
Interview INT-02, 24.04.2017, civil society leader and security expert
Interview INT-03, 02.05.2017, former child soldier of the PLA
Interview INT-04, 23.09.2015, international development worker (1)
Interview INT-05, 02.05.2017, civil society leader and academic
Interview INT-06, 19.10.2015, former government minister and NC member (1)
Interview INT-07, 27.09.2015, retired major general in the NA
Interview INT-08, 25.04.2017, retired lieutenant general in the NA (1)
Interview INT-09, 10.10.2015, former combatant of the PLA
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Interview INT-10, 12.10.2015, former government minister and NC member (2)
Interview INT-11, 22.09.2015, member of the international community
Interview INT-12, 05.10.2015, civil society leader (1)
Interview INT-13, 29.09.2015, retired lieutenant general in the NA (2)
Interview INT-14, 03.05.2017, security sector reform expert
Interview INT-15, 12.11.2015, international development worker (2)
Interview INT-16, 19.10.2015, civil society leader (2)
Interview INT-17, 30.09.2015, former government minister and CPN (M) leader (1)
Interview INT-18, 06.10.2015, former government minister and CPN (M) leader (2)
Focus group FG-01, 28.04.2017, soldiers of the NA
Notes
1. That being said, ex-combatants still face a number of challenges. A former child soldier, for
instance, noted that many of his friends in the PLA remain poor and marginalized and are
ﬁghting a legal battle for compensation (INT-03, 02.05.2017). A development worker
pointed out that some ex-combatants have joined criminal networks; many have left Nepal
in search for labour abroad (INT-04, 23.09.2015). Female ex-combatants still face substantive
discrimination for having transgressed what is regarded as adequate female behaviour
(Bogati 2015), and a civil society leader also noted that many former female combatants
remain at risk for prostitution (INT-05, 02.05.2017).
2. UNMIN did not have substantial veto power over DDR, not least as the missions’ authority was
consistently challenged by the government that perceived it as biased in favour of the Maoist
rebels.
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